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NOTES
Freedom of Association and State
Regulation of Delegate Selection: Potential
for Conflict at the 1984 Democratic
National Convention
I.

INTRODUCTION

Every state has enacted laws that limit the freedom of political parties, including regulations on the method by which political
parties select delegates to the national nominating conventions.'
Although national and state parties historically have accepted
state regulation of their affairs,2 the Democratic National Committee recently has demanded that state parties follow national party
rules rather than conflicting state laws.3 In 1975 and again in 1981
1. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 13-22, at 785 n.1 (1978); see Chambers
& Rotunda, Reform of PresidentialNominating Conventions, 56 VA. L. REV. 179, 182
(1970); Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1975). The extent and constitutionality of federal regulation of political parties is outside the scope of this
Note. In a resolution passed at its 1976 convention, the National Democratic Party expressed its position on this matter:
[T]hat this convention, recognizing the Responsibility of our National Party to provide
for our Presidential nominating process, urges the U.S. Congress to refrain from intervening in these Party affairs unless and until the National Party requests legislative
assistance, and in no case should Congress legislate in any manner which is in derogation of the right of a National Party to mandate its own affairs.
COMMISSION

ON

PRESIDENTIAL

COMM., OPENNESS,

NOMINATION

AND

PARTY

STRUCTURE,

DEMOCRATIC

NAT'L

PARTICIPATION AND PARTY BUILDING: REFORMS FOR A STRONGER DEMO-

CRATIC PARTY 31-32 (1978) [hereinafter cited as WINOGRAD COMM'N REPORT]. See Buckley v.

Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
2. C. COTTER & B. HENNESSY, POLITICS WITHOUT POWER: THE NATIONAL PARTY COMMrrrEEs 19 (1964).

3. L. TRIE, supra note 1, § 13-22. This Note limits its focus to the National Democratic Party because the delegate selection rules of the National Republican Party do not
offer the same potential for conflict between state law and state party rules. The Republican
rules maintain that state laws shall govern in any conflict with state party procedures. REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION, RULES ADOPTED BY THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION,

Rule 31(a), (c), (f), (g) & (n) (1980). Consequently, most of the credentials disputes and
court cases concern state laws and delegate selection procedures of the National Democratic
Party. Political third parties likely will not initiate a state party-state law dispute because
they seldom have conventions or primaries and, therefore, state regulations generally do not
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the Supreme Court agreed with the position of the Democratic National Committee that the states have no interest in regulating the
national party. 4 Accordingly, the Court ruled that state laws cannot require state parties to select delegates in a manner contrary to
national party rules. 5 The Court, however, has not yet addressed
the constitutionality of state regulation of state political parties
when the regulations do not conflict with national party rules, 6 although one lower court has indicated that state statutes may prevail in this situation.'
The Delegate Selection Rules for the 1984 Democratic National Convention give state parties considerable discretion in developing their delegate selection processes for the Convention.8
The national party rules allow a state party to select delegates by
one of several systems that conform to certain minimum standards.' These delegate selection alternatives may lead to credentials challenges at the 1984 Convention if a state party adopts a
method of selection that differs from the method approved by the
state legislature, and both schemes conform to the national party
rules.1" This Note begins with a discussion of the history of the
regulation of state parties by state law and national party rules.
The Note then traces the development of case law concerning state
regulation of party delegate selection procedures. Finally, the Note
explores the potential for credentials disputes and litigation on the
primacy of state party rules over contrary state laws if both the
party rules and the state regulations comply with the Delegate Selection Rules for the 1984 Democratic National Convention. The
Note concludes that the first amendment right of freedom of association guarantees that a state party may select delegates to the
govern their nomination procedures. Third party procedures are also outside the scope of
this Note.
4. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, 95 HARv. L. REv. 17, 241, 247 (1981); see Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419
U.S. 477 (1975).
5. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins
v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
6. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 4, at 247.
7. See Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1981); infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
8. See infra part IV.
9. See id.
10. Accord Schmidt & Whalen, Credentials Contests at the 1968-and 1972-Democratic National Conventions, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1438, 1448 (1969) ("[A]lleged violations of
state laws or party rules-especially those involving the issues of interpretation most likely
to come before the National Convention-may not entail any violation of the Convention's
own standards.").
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national convention in any manner consistent with the national
party rules.1 1
II.

HISTORY OF STATE PARTY REGULATION

A.

The Early Years

By the early 1800's every state had some form of political
party organization consisting of a central committee and a chairman.12 As confederations of county and city committees, these
party organizations held meetings to nominate candidates, direct
campaigns, and distribute patronage. 13 Private citizens voluntarily
14
organized and managed the state parties as private associations.
Since parties were "unknown to" the law, they existed neither "in
compliance with" nor "against" the law. 5 Parties were "wholly
without constitutional basis, products of slow evolution, trial and
error, tradition, and use."16
During their developmental years the state parties operated
solely under their own rules as private associations.17 They wrote
their own constitutions and bylaws and reconciled their internal
disputes." During this period the state parties conducted their af11. The questions presented in this Note have more than just academic appeal. The
method that a state party chooses to select delegates profoundly affects contests to win the
party's nomination and ultimately the Presidency. See A. RANNEY, CURING THE MiSCHMmS OF
FACTION: PARTY RzFoRM IN AMERICA 10-11 (1975). This Note limits its discussion to delegate
selection for the national convention because courts rarely have adjudicated the constitutionality of state regulation of other state party activities. See infra notes 128-43 and accompanying text. The arguments presented in this Note apply, nevertheless, to disputes
concerning a conflict between state laws and state party rules in other contexts. Apart from
assuring fair, nondiscriminatory general party procedures and providing methods for the
selection of national committee members, the national party rules do not govern the conduct of state parties outside the Presidential nomination process. See DsMocRATIc NATIONAL
CoMMrrrsE, TH CHARTER AND BY-LAws OF Tm DEMocRATc PARTY OF THE UNrrz STATES,
art. I (1982). The state parties freely develop their own rules and procedures without national party supervision. To extend the theme of this Note one step further, state party
rules that conform to any applicable national party guidelines prevail over contrary state
laws purporting to regulate state party structure and activities. See infra part IHC.
12. R. HucKSHORN, PARTY LxADERSHI
IN THE STATES 8 (1976).
13. Id.
14. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 75.
15. Id.
16. C. Co'rrR & B. HENNEssY,supra note 2, at 16; see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,
369 n.22 (1976) ("Partisan politics bears the imprimatur only of tradition, not the
Constitution.").
17. Tuttle, Limitations Upon the Power of the Legislature to Control PoliticalParties and Their Primaries,1 MICH. L. REv. 466, 468 (1903).
18.
From their origins in the 1790's until after the Civil War, American political parties at

108
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fairs virtually free of national party or governmental interference.19
To obtain greater influence in the selection of the party's Presidential nominee, state party leaders in 1832 replaced the then-existing congressional caucus system2 ° with the national convention. 1
From the Call2 2 to the first Democratic National Convention in
1832 until 1904 the state party organizations retained exclusive
control of delegate selection to the national convention and, thus,
of the nomination process. 23 Consequently, "until well into the
twentieth century the national conventions remained gatherings
that, in the view of some observers, resembled nothing so much as
'international conferences of delegates from sovereign nations.' "24
State parties appointed delegates to the convention through the
Governor's office, state central committee, or state convention.2 5
all levels were . . . "entirely private association[s]; it was no more illegal to commit
fraud in the party caucus or primary than it would be to do so in the election of an
officer of a drinking club."
A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 78-79 (quoting V.0. Key, American political scientist). See
State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 491, 287 N.W.2d 519, 526
(1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); R. HUCKSHORN, supra note 12, at 12.
19. State parties in the 1800's enjoyed such a preferred position in the law that the
state courts regularly struck down state regulations as an invasion of the parties' internal
affairs. Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National Political
Conventions, 56 CORNELL L. REv. 148, 153 (1970). In 1886 the Colorado Legislature demonstrated its deference to the state party by asking the State Supreme Court: "Is it constitutional to enact any law attempting to regulate the machinery of a political party in making
nominations of candidates for public office?" Tuttle, supra note 17, at 469. In 1866 California and New York became the first states to adopt statutes regulating the internal affairs of
state parties. The California law merely requested state parties to give public notice of party
meetings and New York's statute prohibited bribery in party caucuses. A. RANNEY, supra
note 11, at 79.
20. The congressional caucus consisted of regular meetings of each party's members of
Congress to select the party's national ticket. This system was in effect from 1800 to 1824.
See A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 64-69, 171-74.
21. Id. at 172.
22. The Call, promulgated by the national committee under authority provided by the
preceding national convention, specifies the manner of delegate selection, the order of business, and the procedures of the national convention. Raymar, JudicialReview of Credentials Contests: The Experience of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, 42 Gao.
WASH. L. REv. 1 n.1 (1973).
23. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 174. In 1844 the Democratic National Convention
organized the first credentials committee and thereby rejected the view that each state party
should review the qualifications of its own delegates. Instead, the Convention instituted centralized review by a committee of national party members. Rotunda, Constitutional and
Statutory Restrictions on PoliticalParties in the Wake of Cousins v. Wigoda, 53 Tax. L.
Rav. 935, 947 (1975).
24. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 176.
25. Id. at 82. See State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 491,
287 N.W.2d 519, 526 (1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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B.

The Progressive Reforms

In conjunction with the Progressive movement of the early
1900's, Robert M. La Follette 2s and other reformers targeted state
parties as subjects for legislative regulation. They believed that unsupervised political parties had led to boss rule, political corruption, and election fraud.2 7 Consequently, the reformers demanded
28
comprehensive state laws governing the conduct of state parties.
By 1920 most states had adopted statutes regulating every major
aspect of party structure and activity.2 9
State regulation of state political parties began with laws
designed to eliminate fraudulent conduct in intraparty elections.3 0
Statutes mandated secret ballots for the election of party officers
and candidates.3 " States instituted more regulation at the turn of
the century with the adoption of the Australian ballot.3 2 Since
public authorities printed, distributed, and counted this secret ballot, which specified each candidate's party affiliation next to his
name, legislators began to perceive a need for laws specifying qualifications for party membership, candidacy, and status as a political party.3 3 Next, the states passed statutes closely regulating the
state parties' internal affairs, including what committees and conventions they must have, their membership selection procedures,
who might participate in decisionmaking, and the powers that one
party organ had over another.3 4 Finally, state after state began to
26. For a discussion of the life of Robert M. La Follette and his contribution to the
reform movement, see A. LovEJoY, LA FOLLETTE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECT
PRIMARY IN WISCONSIN-1890-1904 (1941).
27. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 80. During the Progressive era courts
most any party regulation designed to eliminate corruption. Note, supra note
See State ex rel. McCarthy v. Moore, 87 Minn. 308, 311, 92 N.W. 4, 5 (1902)
parties necessary to protect voters against "the corrupt control by party
caucuses and conventions"); People ex rel. Coffey v. Democratic Gen. Comm.,

permitted al19, at 153-54.
(regulation of
managers of
164 N.Y. 335,

340, 58 N.E. 124, 125 (1900) (regulation upheld as necessary to make "snap caucuses impossible, and the selection of delegates by brute force extremely difficult").
28. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 80.
29. Id. at 81.
30. Id. at 79; see supra note 19.
31. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 81. For a comprehensive survey of early state laws
regulating political parties, see Starr, The Legal Status of American PoliticalParties (pts. 1
& 2), 34 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 439, 685 (1940).
32.

A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 79-80.

33.

State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 491, 287 N.W.2d 519,

526 (1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).

34. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 18. The statutes regulated the organizational structure of the parties, the powers and duties of various party assemblies, the composition of the
state central committee and convention, the time and place of committee and convention
meetings, the terms of office of party officials, and the selection of delegates to the national
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adopt the presidential primary 5 to circumvent the power of state
party organizations and to allow greater public participation in the
nominating process.3 6 Increased state regulation restricted the liberty of the state parties to determine the method of selecting delegates to the national convention.
C. Regulation by the National Party
Before 1952 the Democratic National Committee served only
as an "umbilical [cord] between national conventions";3 7 it met to
promulgate the Call to the national convention and to organize the
quadrennial Presidential campaign.3 8 The national party began to
assert control over the state parties with the expulsion of Wright
Morrow from the Democratic National Committee in 1952.11 After
Mr. Morrow endorsed the Republican Presidential nominee, the
National Committee refused to seat him.40 This action served notice upon the state parties that the Committee alone would deterautomatically would accept
mine its membership and no longer
41
anyone certified by a state party.
Four years later the convention itself began to assert control
over its membership. Reacting to the 1948 attempt by the Dixiecrats to campaign for the Presidency under the regular name and
symbols of the Democratic Party,42 the 1956 National Convention
adopted a rule that conditioned the seating of delegates upon the
convention. Comment, One Man, One Vote and Selection of Delegates to National Nominating Conventions, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 536 (1970).
35. State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 493, 287 N.W.2d 519,
527 (1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). By 1916, 26 states had some form of Presidential
primary. WINOGRAD COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2.
36. WINOGRAD COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. For a discussion of the successive
waves of state regulation of political parties, see C. MERRIAM, PRIMARY ELECTIONS 28-47
(1909).
37. C. COTTER & B. HENNESSY, supra note 2, at 4.

38. Id. at 14.
39.

A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 180-81.

40. Id. Morrow's seat remained vacant until 1955 when Senator Lyndon Johnson and
Representative Sam Rayburn persuaded the Texas State Central Committee to appoint a
new committeeman acceptable to the Democratic National Committee. Id. at 180-81.
41. Id. "[Flor over a century after its establishment in 1848 the Democratic National
Committee accepted without question any and all members selected for it by the state parties . . . ." Id.

42. The strategy of the Dixiecrats was to win enough electoral votes under the Democratic Party label to throw the Presidential election into the House of Representatives,
where they could barter with the two major parties for concessions on states' rights issues.
Id. at 182. For a thorough account of the Dixiecrat revolt of 1948, see E. ADER, THE DLxIECRAT MOVEMENT

(1955).
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assurance of each state party that the national committee nominee
would appear on the state ballot as the regular Democratic candidate. 43 This action greatly changed the relationship between national and state parties and "established the centralizing principle
that henceforth the national party agencies will not only decide
how many votes each state delegation gets at the national convention but will also4 4 impose national rules on what kinds of persons
can be selected.
This provision was the precursor of a series of convention
mandates that reaffirmed national party supervision of the delegate selection procedures of the state parties. In 1964 the Democratic National Convention refused to seat several duly elected delegates because they failed to sign a loyalty oath. 45 This controversy
prompted the creation of the first national party commission to
study state systems for selecting delegates. 46 The commission recommended that the party require equal participation in the delegate selection process, and the Call to the 1968 Convention included this resolution. 47 The Convention implemented the reform
by barring the entire Mississippi delegation for alleged racial discrimination in state delegate selection.4 8
Unsatisfied with these reforms the 1968 Convention established the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection
[McGovern-Fraser Commission], which proposed radical changes
in the delegate selection rules. 4'9 The Democratic National Com43. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 182-83.
44. Id. at 183.
45. Rotunda, supra note 23, at 948; see OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL CoNVENTION 4 (1964); T. WHITE, MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1964, 169 n.4 (1965).
46. See COMMISSION ON THE DEMOCRATIC SELECTION OF PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES, DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., THE DEMOCRATIC CHOICE (1968), reprinted in 144 CONG. REC. E9172

(1968). Before the 1964 Democratic National Convention the national party never examined
the method of delegate selection stipulated by state party rules or state laws. Memorandum

from Louise Lindblom, Executive Director of the Compliance Review Comm'n, to members
of the Compliance Review Comm'n (July 27, 1982) (discussing work of the Commission)
[hereinafter cited as Memorandum from Louise Lindblom].
47. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMIrEE, THE CALL FOR THE 1968 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL
CONVENTION (1967).
48. Rotunda, supra note 23, at 948; see Schmidt & Whalen, supra note 10, at 1450
n.50.
49. See COMMISSION ON PARTY STRUCTURE AND DELEGATE SELECTION, DEMOCRATIC
NAT'L COMM., MANDATE FOR REFORM (1971) [hereinafter cited as McGOVERN-FRASER COMM'N

REPORT], reprinted in 117 CONG. REC. 32908 (1971). These changes encompassed 18 guidelines that prohibited ex officio delegates, limited delegate fees to $10.00, eliminated the unit
rule, encouraged full participation by minority groups, women, and youth, and required
delegate selection within the calendar year. Id.
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mittee adopted these piocedural reforms and made compliance
with them a precondition for seating state delegations at the
convention:5 0
By establishing specific procedural criteria that state Democratic parties
would have to meet in choosing delegates to the national convention, the national party achieved an unprecedented degree of control over the actions of
state parties. Although the guidelines acknowledged that delegate-selection
procedures could vary from state to state, the imposition of minimum standards in the operation of these procedures forced every state party to make
significant changes in rules, traditions, and, in some instances, state law."

Then-National Party Chairman Lawrence F. O'Brien commented,
"'Never has a political party so totally changed its way of doing
business in such a short period of time.' -52
The delegate selection rules for the 1972 Presidential nomination "introduced the formalities and some of the ideals of law" into
the national-state party relationship.5 3 Since then the National
Democratic Party has written a Charter and Bylaws5" and, after
each quadrennial convention, has appointed a commission to evaluate and amend the delegate selection rules.5 5 In 1972 the Democratic National Committee produced written rules that required
state parties to make "all feasible efforts" to change state laws that
conflicted with national party regulations.58 Hearing officers appointed by the national party entertained appeals from state parties which claimed that state laws prevented them from complying
57
with the national party rules.
This issue of the predominance of national party rules over
state laws reached the United States Supreme Court for the first
time when the Credentials Committee at the 1972 Democratic Na50.
51.
52.

J. STEWART, ONE LAST CHANCE: THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 1974-76, at 39 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 40.
53. Vining, Delegate Selection Reform and the Extension of Law into Politics,60 VA.
L. REv. 1389, 1389 (1974).
54. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMISSION, THE CHARTER AND THE BY-LAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES (amended Mar. 26, 1982).
55.

See COMMISSION

ON DELEGATE SELECTION AND

PARTY

STRUCTURE, DEMOCRATIC

NAT'L COMM., DEMOCRATS ALL (1973) [hereinafter cited as MIKULSKI COMM'N REPORT]; COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION, DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM. (1982) [hereinafter cited as
HUNT COMM'N REPORT]; WINOGRAD COMM'N REPORT, supra note 1. The Mikulski Commis-

sion Report called for the creation of a Compliance Review Commission to administer and
enforce the delegate selection process. The Compliance Review Commission serves as the
preliminary credentials committee by assisting state parties in developing their delegate selection plans and by hearing delegate challenges. Memorandum from Louise Lindblom,

supra note 46.
56.
57.

McGOVERN-FRASER COMM'N REPORT, supra note 49, at 32915-18.
Vining, supra note 53, at 1398.
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tional Convention recommended the unseating of delegates elected
under the California and Illinois laws that violated national party
rules. 5 The Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of extensive state regulation of the internal affairs of state parties.5 9
The next part of this Note describes the current state of the law
regarding national party rules vis-&-vis state statutes.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW BY THE COURTS

A.

First Amendment Freedom of Association

Because the Founding Fathers regarded political parties as
"evil in intent and disastrous in effect," 60 they made no provision
for such entities in the Constitution."' Nonetheless, they built the
government upon the premise that every citizen has the right to
express his ideas; they enshrined this freedom in the first amendment of the Bill of Rights.2 Political parties traditionally have
served as a medium for the exercise of this fundamental freedom.6
Consequently, the federal courts have ruled repeatedly that "[t]he
express constitutional rights of speech and assembly are of slight
value indeed if they do not carry with them a concomitant right of
political association. Speeches and assemblies after all are not ends
in themselves but means to effect change through the political process."' 64 Specifically, "'[t]he National Democratic Party and its ad58. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). See infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text
for a discussion of this case.
59. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. In Marchioro v. Chaney, 442 U.S. 191
(1979), the Supreme Court declined to examine the constitutionality of a state statute that
set forth the composition of the state party central committee. In 1976 the Washington
State Democratic Convention had adopted an amendment to the party charter to increase
the size of the state central committee above state statutory requirements. Apparently relying on the statute, the state central committee refused to seat the newly elected committee
members at its subsequent meeting. Several members of the Washington State Democratic
Party contended that the state law violated their right to freedom of association under the
first and fourteenth amendments. Since plaintiff challenged the decision of the state central
committee rather than the statute itself, the Court found no substantial burden imposed by
state law on the party's right to govern itself. Id.

60. A.

RANNEY,

supra note 11, at 30; see R. HOFSTADTER,

THE IDEA OF A PARTY SYSTEM

12-16 (1969).
61. Comment, The Application of Constitutional Provisions to Political Parties, 40
TENN. L. REV. 217, 218 (1973).
62. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).
63. Id.
64. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1975); see Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56, 57 (1973); Healy
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
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herents enjoy a constitutionally protected right of political
association.' "65
The fourteenth amendment protects a political party's freedom of association from infringement by the states."' Any state law
that limits the discretion of a political party harms associational
interests.6 7 The right to associate, however, is not absolute.6 8 A
court may sustain a significant interference with the protected
right of political association if a state can demonstrate a sufficiently important interest in the legislation. 9 The court will consider the legislative history and the merit of the state's interest. 0
The statute is constitutional if the state has a legitimate, compel71
ling interest that it cannot accomplish by less restrictive means.
States have used article II, section one of the Constitution as
a basis for enacting statutes prescribing the method of delegate se65. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981) (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975)); see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31
(1968).
66. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968).
67. L. TRBE, supra note 1, § 13-22.
68. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 567 (1973).
69. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976). Although the Supreme Court has utilized
different terms to describe the state interest required to pass constitutional review, see, e.g.,
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) ("paramount" and "vital importance"); Buckley,
424 U.S. at 25 ("sufficiently important"); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975)
("compelling"); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761-62 (1973) ("legitimate"); Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971) ("important"), the test applied to state restraints on political parties is the same strict scrutiny standard used in examining any state infringement on
the freedoms granted by the first eight amendments. Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683,
691 (W.D. Mich. 1980) ("Because fundamental rights guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments are here involved, i.e., a political party's right to freedom of association, this court is called upon to strictly scrutinize the constitutionality of... [the] election
law as it applies to the state Democratic Party."), afl'd, 666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1981). See
also Note, The PartyAffiliation Requirement: A ConstitutionalInquiry, 1980 NEw ENG. L.
REV. 71, 88-89. ("Strict scrutiny, in most applications, has an outcome determinative result
with only a rare statute surviving this most exacting analysis."); Comment, The Constitutionality of Non-Member Voting in PoliticalPartyPrimary Elections, 14 WMLIAMETrE L.J.
259, 274 (1978) ("The Court has stated that the right to associate is fundamental and that
governmental action tending to infringe on the right is subject to the closest judicial
scrutiny.").
70. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 729-30 (1974).
71. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 345
(1972); see Reply Brief for Appellants at 2-3, Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La
Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
72. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . .
").
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lection to political party conventions.73 This provision only gives
states the power to appoint Presidential electors to the electoral
college, and does not extend to them the constitutional authority
to regulate state parties. Furthermore, in exercising their supervisory powers over elections, the states may not infringe upon basic
constitutional protections such as the freedom of association.7 4 The
Court has reasoned that "[a]ny connection between the process of
selecting electors and the means by which political party members
in a State associate to elect delegates to party nominating conventions is so remote and tenuous as to be wholly without constitu'7 5
tional significance.
B.

National Party Rules versus State Statutes

In three recent cases federal and state courts have balanced
the National Democratic Party's right to freedom of association
against conflicting state interests. 78 The courts subjected the state
statutes, which regulated delegate selection, to close scrutiny and
determined that the states did not have a sufficiently important
interest to compel the National Democratic Party to seat delegates
chosen contrary to its rules. 7 The national party rules prevailed
over nonconforming state laws.
1.

Cousins v. Wigoda

The first case to reach the Supreme Court, Cousins v.
Wigoda,7 8 concerned the seating of Illinois delegates at the 1972
Democratic National Convention.7 9 In the Illinois primary the
Cook County Democratic Party selected a slate of delegates for the
73. Note, Judicial Intervention in National Political Conventions: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 59 CORNELL L. Rav. 107, 127 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note, Judicial
Intervention]; Note, National Party Conventions: State's Interest Subordinate to Party's
in Delegate Selection Process, 29 U. MhAi L. REv. 806, 808 (1975).
74. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 4, at 248 n.42; see Kusper v. Pontikes,
414 U.S. 51, 56-57 (1973); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 28-29 (1968); see also Reply
Brief for Appellants, supra note 71, at 2 ("The issue is not whether the State has authority
to enact primary statutes. It is whether the State's exercise of its power violates the National Party's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights ....").
75. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 125 n.31 (1981).
76. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Ferency v. Austin, 666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir.
1981); State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d 519 (1980),
rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
77. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 121 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); Ferency v. Austin, 666 F.2d 1023, 1025 (6th Cir. 1981).
78. 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
79. Id.
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ballot by procedures that violated national party rules.8 0 Although
the voters of Cook County duly elected these "Wigoda" delegates,
the national party's Credentials Committee refused to seat them
and replaced them with the "Cousins" delegates chosen in compliance with party rules.8 ' A Wigoda delegate challenged the constitutionality of the Committee's decision. 2 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit sustained the Committee's action,"s but three days before the opening of the Convention the
Supreme Court granted a stay of the decision. s The following day
the Circuit Court of Cook County acted on a separate suit filed by
the Wigoda delegates" and enjoined the Cousins delegates from
sitting at the Convention." Nevertheless, the Democratic National
Convention adopted the Credentials Committee recommendation
and seated the Cousins delegates.8 7 After the Convention the Supreme Court granted certiorari "to decide . . .whether the [Illinois] Appellate Court was correct in according primacy to state law
over the National Political Party's rules in the determination of
the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to the Party's National Convention.""a
80. Brief for Appellants at 18, Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107 (1981). On June 30, 1972, the Credentials Committee approved the findings of a
hearing officer that the county party chose the elected delegates in violation of party guidelines "A-1 (minority group participation), A-2 (women and youth participation), A-5 (existence of party rules), C-1 (adequate public notice of party affairs), C-4 (timing of delegate
selection), and C-6 (slate-making)." Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 479 & n.1 (1975).
81. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 479-80.
82. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972). The excluded delegates alleged that "the refusal of the party to accept them as delegates denie[d] them due process, and denie[d] the
voters who elected them their right to full participation in the electoral process as guaranteed by the United States Constitution." Id. at 6-7 & n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 1-2. O'Brien consolidated the appeals of two groups of petitioners challenging the recommendations of the Credentials Committee regarding the unseating of delegates. In addition to the Illinois challenge, California delegates committed to Senator
George McGovern contested the Committee's conclusion that the winner-take-all delegate
selection method violated a mandate of the 1968 Democratic National Convention. In actions filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the court dismissed both complaints as nonjusticiable. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit sustained the Committee's decision concerning the Illinois delegates, but held the
Committee's decision regarding the California delegates unconstitutional. Id. at 2; see Blumstein, Party Reform, The Winner-Take-All Primary,and the California Delegate Challenge: The Gold Rush Revisited, 25 VAND. L. REv. 975 (1972).
84. O'Brien, 409 U.S. at 5.
85. The Wigoda delegates filed for an injunction against the Cousins delegates in the
Circuit Court of Cook County on April 19, 1972. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 480 n.2 (1975).
86. Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 18.
87. Cousins, 419 U.S. at 481.
88. Id. at 483.
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The Supreme Court found that Illinois did not have a compelling interest in delegate selection for a national party convention. 9
Since "[t]he States themselves have no constitutionally mandated
role in the great task of the selection of Presidential and VicePresidential candidates,"90 the Court ruled that a state cannot extend extraterritorially its own jurisdiction by regulating the national party.9 1 The need for uniform decisionmaking by a central
body serves a national interest greater than any interest of an individual state.9 2 The Court noted that "[i]f the qualifications and eligibility of delegates to the National Political Party Conventions
were left to state law 'each of the fifty states could establish the
qualifications of its delegates to the various party conventions
without regard to party policy, an obviously intolerable result.' ,s
Since Illinois had no compelling interest in protecting the integrity
of its electoral process, the national party rules had primacy over
state law governing delegate selection.9
2. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette
Following the 1980 Democratic National Convention, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of state regulation of party
delegate selection in Democratic Partyv. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette.9 In May 1979 the Democratic Party of Wisconsin submitted
its Delegate Selection Plan" to the Compliance Review Commission of the national party.17 The Commission rejected the plan because it contravened national party rule 2A, which limited participation in the delegate selection process to Democrats who publicly
declared their party preference.9 The state party's plan incorpo89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 489.
Id. at 489-90.
Id. at 491; see Rotunda, supra note 23, at 936.
419 U.S. at 490; see Rotunda, supra note 23, at 951.

93. 419 U.S. at 490.
94. See Comment, Cousins v. Wigoda Primary Elections, Delegate Selection, and
the National Political Convention, 70 Nw. U.L. Rav. 699 (1975); Developments in the
Law-Elections, supra note 1, at 1209.

95. 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
96. The Delegate Selection Rules of the Democratic National Convention require each
state party to adopt written rules and procedures covering all aspects of the delegate selec-

tion process.

DEMoCRATIC NATIONAL CoMMrrr,

DMEGATE SELECTION

RULES

FOR THE 1980

DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVrNTION 1-3 (1978).
97. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 112.
98. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 8.12(3)(b) (1977) (amended 1982). The open primary system
permits any registered voter to vote in either the Democratic or the Republican primary.
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rated the Wisconsin open primary law, 99 which permitted all voters, regardless of party preference, to vote in the Democratic primary. The national party rules did not forbid a state from
conducting an open primary "so long as it [was] not binding on the
National Party Convention.' 0 0
The Wisconsin Attorney General' 0 ' brought an original action
on behalf of the State in the Wisconsin Supreme Court against the
National Democratic Party and the Democratic National Committee for a declaration that the national party constitutionally could
not refuse to seat the Wisconsin delegation at the 1980 Convention. 02 Concluding that the open primary law did not substantially
burden the national party's freedom of association and that the
State had compelling interests in the election statute, the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared the state delegate selection system
constitutional and binding on the national party.10 3 Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's stay of the Wisconsin judgment, 0 4 the national party seated the Wisconsin delegates even
though the method of their selection had violated rule 2A. 105
A six-member majority of the Supreme Court found that La
Follette presented the same issue as Cousins and reversed the Wisconsin decision.1 06 The Court determined that Wisconsin had im99. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMmirrEB, supra note 96, at 3-4. "Rule 2A is an integral
part of the National Party's twelve-year effort to reform its processes for choosing presidential candidates." Brief for Appellants, supranote 80, at 4; see supra notes 37-59 and accompanying text.
100. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 121. The Wisconsin statute, however, did bind the national convention.
The voters in Wisconsin's "open" primary express their choice among Presidential candidates for the Democratic Party's nomination; they do not vote for delegates to the
National Convention. Delegates to the National Convention are chosen separately, after the primary, at caucuses of persons who have stated their affiliation with the Party.
But these delegates, under Wisconsin law, are bound to vote at the National Convention in accord with the results of the open primary election.
Id. at 111-12 (footnotes omitted).
101. Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. La Follette is the grandson of Robert La
Follette. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
102. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 113.
103. State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 287 N.W.2d 519
(1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
104. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 114-15.
105. Id. Rule 20 permits exemptions from these rules when state parties take "probable positive steps to achieve legislative changes to bring the state law into compliance with
the provisions" of the Delegate Selection Rules. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMirTEE, supra
note 96, at rule 20. Even though the rules forbid a rule 20 exemption from rule 2A, id. at
rule 2B, the Credentials Committee decided to seat the Wisconsin delegates. Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 12.
106. 450 U.S. at 121.
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posed a substantial burden on the party's freedom of association
by refusing to accommodate the collective will of the national
party absent a compelling state interest.10 7 The Court stated that
Wisconsin had a substantial interest in the conduct of the Presidential preference primary but could not mandate that the primary result govern delegate voting at the national convention. 0 8
Unlike Cousins, the La Follette opinion emphasized the importance of a political party's goals and the need for a party to have
the freedom to choose the means it believes will best advance its
interests. 0 9 The Court did not mention, as it did in Cousins, the
impermissible application of extraterritorial jurisdiction and the
need for national uniformity. 110 The three dissenting Justices""
found that the national party lacked: any ideology that a primary
open to non-Democrats seriously would distort and that the state
had compelling interests in increasing voter participation and
maintaining the secrecy of the ballot." 2
3.

Ferency v. Austin

In Ferency v. Autsin'113 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit heard a case similar to La Follette that concerned the Michigan open primary law. Ferency differed from La Follette in that
the Michigan Democratic Party adopted a delegate selection plan
in contravention of state law but in conformity with the national
delegate selection rules. 1 4 The Sixth Circuit held that an alternative delegate selection plan prepared by a state party in compliance with national party rules has primacy over a nonconforming
state law scheme. 1 5
Before the Sixth Circuit heard the case on appeal, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in La FolIette. Concluding that
both Cousins and La Follette gave primacy to national party rules
107. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 4, at 242.
108. 450 U.S. at 125-26; see supra note 100.
109. 450 U.S. at 123-24 & n.26. See Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party,
525 F.2d 567, 585 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
110. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
111. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, wrote in dissent. See
infra note 112.
112. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term, supra note 4, at 243. See La Follette, 450 U.S.
at 126-38 (1981) (dissenting opinions).
113. 666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1981).
114. Id. at 1024-25. In La Follette the Democratic Party of Wisconsin defended the
state law. See La Follette, 450 U.S. at 133 (Powell, J., dissenting).
115. Ferency, 666 F.2d at 1025.
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over contrary state laws, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling in favor of the state party11 and held that these
cases controlled the constitutionality of the Michigan open primary law. 117 The Sixth Circuit recognized that a state party dele-

gate selection plan would prevail over a nonconforming plan mandated by state law but, like the Supreme Court in Cousins and La
Follette, the court did not address the situation in which the state
statute conforms to national party rules. The district court, however, had heard precisely this argument, which is the central issue
of this Note: Can state law constitutionally require the state party
to select delegates in a manner that conforms with national party
rules but differs from the state party's chosen method?
After arguing unsuccessfully to the district court that Michigan law required the state party to participate in the open primary, plaintiff' 18 contended alternatively that another state law, 1 ,
consistent with national party rules,120 required the Michigan
Democratic Party to select delegates in state and county conventions rather than by caucus as the alternate delegate selection plan
stipulated.121 Avoiding the constitutional issue, the court determined that the legislature had repealed the relevant statute without clearly articulating its interest in supervising the delegate selection process of a party not participating in the open primary.12 2
In dictum, however, the court implied that state law would prevail
over state party procedures if the legislature designated a delegate
selection scheme: "This is not to say that the legislature is powerless to require party implementation of state conventions. 1 23 Accordingly, no court yet has decided whether a state party delegate
selection plan has primacy over a different plan approved by the
116. 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 1023 (6th Cir. 1981).
117. Ferency, 666 F.2d at 1025.
118. Plaintiff was Zolton Ferency, an attorney and precinct delegate elected in the
open primary. Id. at 1024.
119. Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683, 695-96 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d
1023 (6th Cir. 1981).
120. 493 F. Supp. at 695-96. The Michigan Democratic Party, however, raised the issue at oral argument that this state law might violate national party rules. Id. at 695.

121. Id. Since the national party rules forbade the Michigan Democratic Party from
allocating delegate votes on the basis of the open primary result, the state party developed
an alternate plan providing for delegate selection and allocation in caucuses. The Michigan
law stated, "[pJolitical parties not participating in the presidential primary shall elect their
delegates and alternates [by state and county conventions]." Id. at 696 (quoting MiCH.
Conp. LAWS ANN. § 168.617 (1972) (repealed 1976)).
122.
123.

493 F. Supp. at 696.
Id.
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state legislature when both schemes conform to the national party
rules.
C.

Legitimate State Interests

In contrast to Cousins and La Follette, some cases have held
that states have a compelling interest in regulating electoral
processes. Although states have no constitutionally mandated role
in Presidential nomination,12 4 the Constitution does grant them
power to make laws concerning the time, place, and manner of
holding primary and general elections for state and federal offices. 25 Unless Congress directs otherwise, states may regulate the
conduct of these elections and determine voter qualifications

within the confines of the Constitution. 126
States have a compelling interest in preserving the integrity
and orderliness of the electoral process and the right of citizens to
vote.127 Consequently, courts have held constitutional statutes
designed to eliminate political corruption and election fraud.12 8 To
ensure orderly elections, states may require candidates to have
substantial support within their parties, 2 9 insist that parties settle
their internal competition before the general election,13 0 limit each
party to one candidate for each office on the general election ballot, 31 and establish requirements for ballot access. 3 2 States also
have a legitimate interest in encouraging party loyalty, ss strengthening political parties, 3 4 establishing party affiliation require124. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1975); see supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
125. "The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed as each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress
may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of Choosing
Senators." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4; see Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 122 (1970).
126. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 124-25.
127. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 n.28 (1981);
see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
128. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972);
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); supra note 30 and accompanying text.
129. See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 782 n.14 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson,
403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
130. See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. at 781.
131. See id. at 786.
132. See id. at 782-84; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 664 F.2d 554, 564-67 (6th Cir. 1981).
133. Seergy v. Kings County Republican County Comm., 459 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir.
1972).
134. See id.; Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837, 845 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 429 U.S.
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ments,13 5 and eliminating cross-over voting 3 8 and raiding. 3 ' Finally, states have a compelling interest in providing secrecy of the
ballot, increasing voter participation in primaries, and preventing
harassment of voters. se
Federal and state courts, however, have struck down as unconstitutional some state laws regulating elections for public and party
office. The Supreme Court overturned Texas laws that disqualified
blacks from participating in primaries 3 9 and that required a filing
fee to run for local political office.14 0 The Court found that Mississippi did not have a compelling interest justifying a state statute
that regulated the use of the Democratic Party name." Generally,
state laws may not confer partisan advantages upon one political
party and deny them to another.1 42 Any legislation regarding elections must have uniform application throughout the state.1 43
The compelling state interests in the conduct of elections for
public office and in effective suffrage probably do not apply to primary elections and other party procedures for the selection of delegates to a national party convention.14 4 Although Cousins and La
989 (1976).
135. Compare Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (six month preregistration upheld), Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (11 month preregistration upheld) with
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (23 month preregistration held unconstitutional).
See also Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 1, at 1163 ("Thirty-four states
and the District of Columbia have attempted to preserve the ideological coherence of parties
through statutes preventing persons not affiliated with a party from voting in its candidateselection and delegate-selection primaries."); id. at 1163-65.
136. Cross-over voting differs from raiding in that cross-over voters decide to participate in another party's primary because it appears more interesting, whereas raiders vote in
the other party's primary in an effort to foist the least attractive candidate upon their opponent. Adamany, Cross-Over Voting and the Democratic Party's Reform Rules, 70 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 536, 538 (1976).
137. See Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 758 (1973); Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F.
Supp. 837, 847 (D. Conn.), aff'd mem., 429 U.S. 989 (1976).
138. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124-25
(1981).
139. See Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); see also Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73 (1932) (Texas Democratic Party excluded blacks from primary on the basis of state law
authorizing party executive committees to prescribe voter qualifications).
140. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709
(1974) (California law on filing fees held unconstitutional).
141. See Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 508 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1975).
142. Tuttle, supra note 17, at 472; see Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457
U.S. 1 (1982); State ex rel. Fitz v. Jensen, 86 Minn. 19, 89 N.W. 1126 (1902).
143. Tuttle, supra note 17, at 471 (citing Marsh v. Hanly, 111 Cal. 368, 43 P. 975
(1896)).
144. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 489 (1975); see also id. at 497 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[S]tate regulation of state primaries or conventions for state offices raises different considerations requiring a wholly different balance.").
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Follette do not provide a universal pronouncement on the constitutionality of state legislation regarding delegate selection systems
or other internal party matters, the opinions indicate that these
laws likely will not pass constitutional scrutiny. The Court in
Cousins stated, "Consideration of the special function of delegates
to. . . a Convention militates persuasively against the conclusion
that the asserted interest constitutes a compelling state interest [in
the regulation of the party]. ' 14 5 Since a state does not have a compelling interest in this activity, it should refrain from regulating
internal party matters.

IV.

THE

1984

DELEGATE SELECTION RULES AND GOALS

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's ruling that states have
no constitutionally mandated role in the Presidential nomination
process,146 states have continued to regulate the method by which
state parties select delegates to the Democratic National Convention.1 47 Because the states have a compelling interest in the conduct of elections for public office and state parties often use primary elections to select delegates to the national convention, state
parties are in the "anomalous position of having one of their functions-nomination of their candidates-governed by the states as
an integral part of the comprehensive state-regulated election system. 14 8 The participation of both the state and the party in the
nomination process makes conflict inevitable. Delegate Selection
Rules for the 1984 Democratic National Convention'4 9 aggravate
the situation by rewriting the 1980 rules, which at least one state
has enacted into law,1 50 and by providing the state parties with
new alternatives for choosing delegates.
The Commission on Presidential Nomination 15' developed the
1984 Delegate Selection Rules with specific goals in mind.1 52 Observing that "remote-control campaigns, single-issue crusades, and
145. Id. at 489.
146. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
147. State ex rel. La Follette v. Democratic Party, 93 Wis. 2d 473, 494, 287 N.W.2d
519, 528 (1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). For a description of state procedures used in the
1980 presidential nominating process, see DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION COMMITTEE,

THE DEMOCRATS 80-92 (1980).
148. La Follette, 93 Wis. 2d at 494, 287 N.W.2d at 528.
149. On March 26, 1982, the Democratic National Committee approved the 1984 Delegate Selection Rules, as contained in the HuNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 59.
150. See CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 6305-6365.2 (West Supp. 1982).
151. See HuNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 59.
152. Id. at 1-2.
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faceless government" were replacing a nominating process once
characterized by "the politics of personal contact, deliberative
judgment, coalition and compromise," the Commission promulgated rules to strengthen "the party as a cohesive force in government and within the electorate."15' 3 The rules give elected and
party officials a greater role in the nomination process, return some
decisionmaking discretion to the national convention, and allow
state parties more options in formulating their delegate selection
plans.'"
Under the 1984 rules a state party may select its base delegation by primary, convention, caucus, or any combination of these
methods.1 55 Additionally, the new rules provide that a state may
choose at-large delegates, 56 and party and elected official delegates 57 under three options: a state convention, a committee consisting of all delegates elected at the district level, or a State Democratic Committee. 5 8

The 1984 rules present state parties with an increased number
of acceptable systems for allocating delegates among Democratic
Presidential candidates. Rule 12 on the Fair Reflection of Presidential Preferences gives the state parties greater freedom to shape
their delegate selection processes "in light of their own preferences
and traditions." 15 9 The 1980 rules required that state parties allocate delegates to a candidate in proportion to the vote, above a
specified threshold, 160 that the Presidential contender won in a

particular district caucus or primary.6 1 In 1984 a state party has

two additional options for fair reflection of the voters' Presidential
preferences. It may choose the "bonus delegate plan," which ini153. Id. at 2.
154. Id. at 6-7.
155. Whether a party decides to use a Presidential preference primary or a caucus
system, 75% of its base delegation must be elected at the congressional district level or
lower. The other 25% of the base delegation is elected at large. Id. at rule 7C.
156. Id. at rules 7C, 8.
157. The new rules provide that elected and party officials will constitute 22% of the
convention delegates. The House Democratic Caucus and the Senate Democratic Conference
will choose approximately 14% of these delegates to remain unpledged. The state parties
will ielect the remainder, who may or may not commit themselves to a candidate. Id. at
rules 7, 8.
158. Id. at rules 8C, 9B. The State Democratic Committee must meet certain specified
criteria to participate in delegate selection. See id. at rule 8C.
159. Id. at 22.
160. "The threshold in states holding a binding primary shall be calculated by dividing the number of delegates to be elected in the district into 100%, except that the threshold shall not exceed 25%. The threshold in caucus states shall be 20%." Id. at rule 12A(1).
161. Id. at 21.
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tially awards one delegate to the primary or caucus winner in a
district and then allocates proportionally the remainder of the delegates elected from that district.162 Alternatively, in districts no
larger than a congressional district, the party may opt for direct
election of individual delegates on the primary ballot.16 3
These options for delegate selection and allocation invite conflict between state laws and state party procedures that both conform to national party rules and provide for different delegate selection systems.1 . 4 For example, a state may decide to retain the
laws it passed for the 1980 Presidential campaign, notwithstanding
the state party's current desire to implement one of the options
provided in the new rules. Conversely, a state may adopt new laws
that conform to the 1984 delegate selection rules but do not incorporate the party's preferred option. As the 1984 Democratic National Convention approaches, these new rules will lead to a process of accommodation or confrontation between state legislatures
and state parties.16 5 The next part discusses the likely resolution of
a confrontation, first by the national convention and then by the
courts.
V.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE PARTY AND STATE STATUTE

A.

Resolution by the Democratic National Convention

If a conflict arises in 1984 between state statutes and state
party procedures, the national convention and the courts will use
different techniques and standards to determine whether state interest or party preference prevails. While the pressures of
campaigning for and winning the Presidency will sway the national
convention, the courts will have to balance the asserted state interest against the party's freedom of association. The judicial outcome is more predictable than the political determination.
The national convention traditionally has applied state law
162. Id. at rule 12A(2). Districts that elect fewer than three delegates may not use this
option. Id.
163. Id. at rule 12A(3).
164. The scope and extent of this conflict will not be apparent until April 15, 1983,
when state parties must submit their delegate selection plans to the Compliance Review
Commission of the Democratic National Committee. See id. at rule 1C.
165. This Note does not discuss all of the conflicts that could arise between state law
and the state party in the choice of delegate selection procedures. Other conflicts may develop concerning prerequisites for party membership and participation in the delegate selection process, petition requirements for delegate candidates, and filing deadlines for Presidential candidates.
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and, in its absence, state party rules. 166 The national party, however, has not applied this policy consistently. At the 1912 and 1932
Democratic National Conventions state delegations presented credentials disputes necessitating a choice between state party procedures and state laws that allowed two different methods of delegate selection, each of them acceptable to the national party.
Historical factors and political forces explain the different conclusions reached by the delegates seated at the conventions in each
year.
At the 1912 Democratic National Convention, nineteen delegates from Ohio contended that the unit rule 8 7 imposed by their
state party convention violated state law.16 8 The state convention
had instructed all of Ohio's delegates to vote for the state governor, a favorite son candidate, who had won Ohio's party-run statewide Presidential preference primary. 16 9 The dissenting delegates,
who had been elected at the district level pursuant to state law,
maintained that this state convention mandate did not apply to
them. 17 0 Addressing the National Convention, Mr. I. J. Dunn, a
delegate from Nebraska, stated the issue:
I ask you, which do you believe ought to be binding upon a Democratic National Convention-a State-wide primary called by the Democratic State
Central Committee of Ohio without recognition in the State law, or a district
primary called and held under the authority of law, where every Democrat
was given an opportunity to cast his vote under the law of that Sovereign
State? Is the law of the State Central Committee of Ohio, or the State Convention, greater than the law of the State of Ohio, which represents the majority and will of the sovereign people of that State?17'

Notwithstanding the national convention's historical enforcement
166. C. COTTER & B. HENNESSY, supra note 2, at 19. Courts traditionally have held
that parties may establish their own nominating procedures when no state law governs the
nominating process. See, e.g., Smith v. McQueen, 232 Ala. 90, 166 So. 788 (1936); Foster v.
Ponder, 235 Ark. 660, 361 S.W.2d 538 (1962); McLain v. Fish, 159 Ark. 199, 251 S.W. 686
(1923); Malone v. Superior Ct., 40 Cal. 2d 546, 254 P.2d 517 (1953); Wallace v. Cash, 328
S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1959); Phillips v. Gallagher, 73 Minn. 528, 76 N.W. 285 (1898); State ex reL.
McCurdy v. De Maioribus, 176 Ohio St. 108, 198 N.E.2d 60 (1965); Wall v. Currie, 147 Tex.
127, 213 S.W.2d 816 (1948); State ex reL. Smith v. Bosworth, 145 W. Va. 753, 117 S.E.2d 610
(1960).
167. The unit requires that all members of a state delegation vote according to the
preferences of the majority. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 17.
168. W. HART, THE DEMocRATIc CONVENTIONS OF 1908-1912-1916 REPUBLICAN CONvENTIONS OF 1912-1916 AND PRoGRaSsiv CONmENTION OF 1912 wrrH OTHER POLITICAL AND HisTORICAL OBSERVATIONS 116 (1916).
169. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMocRArIc NATIONAL CONVENTION 59-75 (1912).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 74.
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of the unit rule, 17 2 the Democratic National Committee 17 3 passed a

preconvention resolution giving state central committees the right
to choose the method of delegate selection provided that no state
law imposed a mandatory method.17 4 Consistent with convention
history, the Credentials Committee recommended the recognition
of state party procedure over state law, but the national assembly
17 5
adopted the Committee's minority report favoring state law. Po-

litical considerations explain this outcome: First, the majority of
the delegates favored Woodrow Wilson for the nomination over the
candidate supported by the Ohio unit rule, and second, the unit
rule had become associated with discredited political bossism. 17 6

At the 1932 Democratic National Convention, several Minnesota delegates challenged the procedures used by the state central
committee at the state convention.1 77 Minnesota law required that
delegates elected in district primaries pursuant to state law constitute county conventions, which, in turn, select delegates to the
state convention.' 7 8 The state convention, however, customarily
had allowed each member of the state central committee to vote at
the convention. When the state convention met, the delegates
learned that the state chairman had packed the state committee by
appointing more than one hundred members. 17 The indignant delegates elected according to state law convened on their own and
sent a separate delegation to the national convention. Notwithstanding the inherent unfairness of the state party procedures, the
Credentials Committee recommended seating the delegates chosen
in the state convention dominated by the Minnesota Central
Committee.'"
Once again, political maneuvering controlled the decisionmaking process as the National Convention seated the delegates selected by the party-run state convention instead of those elected
pursuant to state law. 81 The delegates chosen under state law had

Ny,

172. The Democratic National Convention enforced the unit rule until 1976. A. RANsupra note 11, at 85.
173. OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOcRAvc NATIONAL CONVENTION 66 (1912).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177.

(1932).
178.
179.
180.
181.

OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CoNVmENTON 54-58, 71-79

Id. at 54.
Id.
Id. at 73.
Id. at 79.
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no commitment to any candidate, whereas the delegates controlled
by the state party chairman were instructed to vote as a unit for
Franklin Roosevelt, the eventual Convention nominee.18 A vote
for state party procedures over state law was a vote for Mr.
Roosevelt.
If a credentials dispute arises at the 1984 Democratic National
Convention, the delegates may have to choose between state laws
and state party procedures, both of which conform to national
party rules. The recently enacted Charter and Bylaws of the national party offer no guidance on this issue.183 Like the 1912 and
1932 controversies, the conflict necessarily will consist of a challenge by a faction of a state delegation or by a group claiming to be
the official state delegation. Absent such a challenge, the Credentials Committee will not concern itself with state laws and routinely will seat those delegates chosen according to the delegate
selection plan adopted by the state party and approved by the national party's Compliance Review Commission.18 4 The outcome of
a challenge is unpredictable, but the leading contenders for the
Democratic nomination certainly will play a major role in resolving
the conflict. If the challengers do not bring the dispute to the
courts, the national convention will make the final
determination.185
B. Resolution by the Courts
1. The Political Question Doctrine
If a challenge concerning the 1984 Delegate Selection Rules
reaches the courts, constitutional analysis will replace politics as
the method of resolving the conflict between state laws and state
party rules. Since any state statute regulating delegate selection
procedures infringes upon the state party's fundamental right of
freedom of association, a court will subject the asserted state interest to strict scrutiny to determine whether it is legitimate and
182. Id. at 74.
183. Interview with Ronald D. Eastman, counsel for appellants in La Follette, in
Washington, D.C. (Aug. 5, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Interview with Ronald D. Eastman].
184. Telephone interview with Louise Lindblom, Executive Director of the Compliance Review Commission (July 26, 1982). "The position currently taken by the dominant
forces in both national parties is that, in the absence of congressional legislation to the
contrary, the national parties are private associations, not public agencies; and as such they
have a right to govern their own affairs by their own rules without regard to contrary provisions in state laws." A. RANY, supra note 11, at 85.
185. C. COTrER & B. HENNESSY, supra note 2, at 19.
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compelling.1 86 No state interest in delegate selection likely will
meet this stringent standard, because the Constitution protects18 a7
party's interest in choosing its own methods to achieve its goals.
Several situations may lead to litigation of the conflict between state law and state party rules. A state, similar to Wisconsin
in La Follette, may seek a declaration that its delegate selection
system is constitutional as applied to the state party and that the
National Democratic Party must seat its delegates.18 8 An interested person, such as plaintiff in Ferency, may seek a declaratory
judgment that would require state officials to enforce election laws
against the state party. 8 " A state, objecting to the delegate selection procedures used by the state party, may deny automatic ballot
access to the candidate nominated by the Democratic National
Convention. 90 If so, the state or national party may challenge the
denial as an unconstitutional infringement of its freedom of
association.1 91
A court may not resolve those disputes if it makes a threshold
determination that the issue presents a nonjusticiable political
question.19 2 "Assuming that political parties are necessary to our
representative form of government, the question arises whether the
judiciary possesses the requisite resources and expertise to intervene in party affairs without seriously, perhaps fatally, impairing
the parties' functioning."1 Federal courts have avoided the task
of resolving controversies concerning county and state parties by
invoking the political question doctrine. 194 Although the Supreme
Court did not address this issue in Cousins or La Follette,1 95 the
Court has stated, "It is hostile to a democratic system to involve
the judiciary in the politics of the people. . . . Courts ought not
186. See supra notes 67 & 69-71 and accompanying texts.
187. Interview with Ronald D. Eastman, supra note 183. See Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
188. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 113 (1981).
189. See Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 1023

(6th Cir. 1981); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Supp. IV 1980) (Declaratory Judgment Act).
190. Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 1, at 1212.
191. Id.
192. Rotunda, supra note 23, at 936.
193. Id. at 945.
194. Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1968); Lynch v.
Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965); Smith v. State Exec. Comm. of Democratic Party,
288 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Chandler v. Neff, 298 F. Supp. 515 (W.D. Tex. 1924).
195. Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 483 n.4 (1975); see Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981).
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enter this political thicket. '196 The elements of the doctrine, how1 97
ever, do not necessarily compel judicial restraint in this area.
The strand of the political question doctrine deeming some issues nonjusticiable because of a "constitutional commitment" to a
coordinate branch of government clearly is inapposite to conflicts
concerning political parties. 198 Since parties have no basis in the
Constitution 99 and, therefore, do not serve as political branches of
government, the separation of powers principle advanced by this
aspect of the doctrine does not warrant judicial abstention.2 0 0 Two
other strands, "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" and "impossibility of deciding without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, '2 0' may
justify judicial refusal to adjudicate these matters. Accordingly,
courts should consider the nature of the dispute and its timing in
determining whether to apply the political question doctrine.
A court can find judicially discoverable and manageable standards in the national party's own rules if a dispute arises over the
conformity of state or national party actions to party regulations,1° or over whether the party actions satisfied due process.203
Similarly, in a controversy between state party delegate selection
procedures and state law, a court would apply first amendment
analysis. 2 0 4 The judiciary, however, should not attempt to resolve
contests between political factions for ideological control of the
party. These challenges present policy determinations outside a
196. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552-56 (1946).
197. See Note, Mandates of the National PoliticalParty Clash with Interests of the
Individual States as the Party Executes its Policy by Abolition of State Delegate Selection
Results: Legal Issues of the 1972 Democratic Convention and Beyond, 4 Loy. U. CHi. L.J.
137 (1973); Note, Judicial Intervention in the PresidentialSelection Process: One Step
Backwards, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1184 (1972); Comment, PoliticalParties, Courts and Political Question Doctrine:New Developments, 52 OR. L. REv. 269 (1973).
198. Raymar, supra note 22, at 16 ("There is no 'textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the [selection of Presidential nominees] to a coordinate political department' of the federal government, and, at least since 1832, there has been no question of
judicial review 'expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government.' ").
See Note, JudicialIntervention in PoliticalParty Disputes: The Political Thicket Reconsidered, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 622, 634 (1975).
199. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
200. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
201. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
518 (1969).
202. Developments in the Law-Elections,supra note 1, at 1203; see Developments in
the Law-JudicialControl of Actions of PrivateAssociations, 76 HI&v. L. REv. 983, 994-98
(1963).
203. O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
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court's discretion.
The courts also must consider timing in deciding whether to
invoke the political question doctrine. Faced with deciding two credentials contests a few days before the opening of the 1972 Democratic National Convention, the Supreme Court in O'Brien v.
Brown 20 5 took the traditional judicial approach and allowed the
highest authority within the party, the national convention, to resolve the disputes. 06 It stayed the ruling of the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, which had adjudicated the
challenges207 after the district court had found the complaints nonjusticiable. °5 Moreover, the Court implied that judicial intervention was inappropriate at anytime during an ongoing nomination
process: "It has been understood since our national political parties first came into being as voluntary associations of individuals
that the convention itself is the proper forum for determining intra-party disputes as to which delegates shall be seated. ' 20 9 Ac-

cordingly, the Court's decision in La Follette and Cousins followed
the conclusion of the nominating process.210
In theory, a conflict between state law and party procedures
might arise at almost any stage of the delegate selection process.
Challengers may seek judicial review following the promulgation of
national or state party rules,211 after the Credentials Committee
decides a particular challenge,212 following the national convention's adoption or rejection of the Committee report, or after the
205. 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
206. Id. at 5 ("[Flor nearly a century and a half the national political parties themselves have determined controversies regarding the seating of delegates to their conventions."); see Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683, 694 (W.D. Mich. 1980), affl'd, 666 F.2d
1023 (6th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he courts have given broad latitude to political parties to enable
them to conduct their own affairs and settle their own disputes without judicial interference."); Tuttle, supra note 17, at 468; Comment, supra note 34, at 558; see Note, Constitu-

tional Law: ConventionalReluctance or DoctrinalDeparture?The PoliticalQuestion Doctrine, 51 N.C. L. Rav. 290, 291 (1972); Case Note, Constitutional Law-The Political
Question Doctrine-O'Brien v. Brown and Keane v. National Democratic Party, 22 DE
PAUL L. REv. 887, 896 (1973); Comment, O'Brien v. Brown: The Politics of Avoidance, 58
IOWA L. REv. 432, 446 (1972).

207. See Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563 (D.C. Cir.), stayed, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
208. Brown, 469 F.2d at 565.
209.

O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1, 4 (1972); see Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491

(1975).
210. See Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981);
Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 490 (1975). But cf. Note, JudicialIntervention,supra note
73, at 130 (courts should actively intervene in conventions).
211. See Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1981).
212. See O'Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972).
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convention.2 13 Arguably, the least intrustive and most effective
time for court intervention is at the submission of the state party's
2 14
delegate selection plan to the Compliance Review Commission.
In Ferency v. Austin, plaintiff hoped that litigation at this stage of
the delegate selection process would allow a judicial resolution of
the conflict before the start of the national convention. 1 5 The national party in 1983,216 however, may object to judicial interference
at this time because the Convention would not have an opportunity to settle the state delegation dispute itself. Nevertheless, given
its deferential approach in O'Brien and practical time constraints,
the Supreme Court probably will not rule on conflicting state law
and state party delegate selection procedures until the conclusion
of the Convention and Presidential election.2 17 If a case does appear on the Court docket, the adjournment of the Convention will
not moot the dispute.2 18 The issue most certainly will fall within
controversies that are "capable of repetition,
the class of cases and
2 19
review.
evading
yet
2.

The Compelling Party Interest

If a court finds a challenge concerning state regulation of state
parties justiciable, it must subject the state law to first amendment
freedom of association analysis. La Follette provides the constitutional standard of review for a challenged state statute. Resolution
of the issue that this Note presents, however, requires extending
the La Follette analysis to the situation in which both state law
and state party procedures comply with national party rules. In
Cousins, La Follette, and Ferency the federal courts based their
decisions on the violation of national party rules by the state stat213. Raymar, supra note 22, at 15; see Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); O'Brien v. Brown, 409
U.S. 1, 9 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
214. Note, supra note 198, at 652.
215. See Ferency v. Austin, 493 F. Supp. 683 (W.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd, 666 F.2d 1023
(6th Cir. 1981).
216. See supra note 164.
217. The courts should refrain from adjudicating a dispute concerning delegate selection during the period between the nomination and the Presidential election because of the
"need for unquestioning adherence to political decision already made." See Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
218. Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 12 n.12.
219. Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 115 n.13 (1981);
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333
n.2 (1972).
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utes.2 0° In 1984 state laws may conform to national party rules yet
contradict state party procedures. Whether the state is regulating
the national party or the state party should make no difference in
the balance of that party's right to freedom of association against a
state's asserted interest in its laws.
Dictum in Cousins concerning the need for national uniformity in delegate selection and the implied unconstitutionality of a
state's extraterritorial extension of its authority22 ' may suggest
that a different balancing test should apply in reviewing state regulation of state parties when state law does not interfere with the
associational rights of the national party. 2 Unlike the laws in
Cousins, La Follette, and Ferency, a state statute that complies
with the national party rules only affects the state party's rights of
association. The Supreme Court in La Follette, however, did not
adopt the reasoning of the Cousins dictum; 22 3 instead, it relied
strictly upon freedom of association analysis. The Court stated: "A
political party's choice among the various ways of determining the
make-up of a State's delegation to the party's national convention
is protected by the Constitution. ' 224 A state law regulating a state
party's choice of delegate selection procedures is as unconstitutional as a state statute that impinges upon the freedom of association of the national party. Consequently, any state regulation of
delegate selection that contradicts state party procedures should
undergo the same strict scrutiny mandated by the Court in La
Follette.
States have attempted unconvincingly to justify their regulations of party rights of association on the basis of some constitutional grant of authority.2 25 The issue is not whether states have
the authority to enact statutes regulating party primaries, conventions, or caucuses, but whether the states' exercise of their power
interferes impermissibly with the first and fourteenth amendment
rights of political parties. 22 The only constitutionally legitimate
state interest in political party activities is the regulation of congressional and state elections for the limited purpose of assuring
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See supra notes 80, 98-100, & 113-15 and accompanying texts.
See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
See Court Voids Wisconsin Open PrimaryLaw, 67 A.B.A. J. 491-92 (1982).
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 124 (1981).
See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
Reply Brief for Appellants, supra note 71, at 2.
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their orderliness.227 This state interest is not present in the selection of delegates to a national party convention.228 Accordingly, a
state party that submits a delegate selection plan in compliance
with the national rules is constitutionally immune from state interference with its preferred procedures.
The La Follette opinion emphasized the importance of freedom of association to effective implementation of the party's
goals.2 29 This emphasis perhaps reflected the argument of the Na-

tional Democratic Party:
First and Fourteenth Amendment protection against state infringement
of associational rights applies with special force where political parties are
selecting their candidates. A party's candidate selection process represents an
organized attempt of like-minded individuals to shape the policies, programs,
and personnel of the government itself. Moreover, when choosing candidates,
political parties make decisions reconciling the varied interests of their adherents. These decisions reflect political judgments and compromises that are
easily distorted by government intrusion.... There are virtually no standards by which legislatures or judges can determine with certainty the political effectiveness of a particular choice of means to achieve a concededly valid
objective.2 3

Since the nomination process is so critical to the purposes for
which individuals decide to associate in political parties, state laws
should not burden a state party's freedom in choosing its method
of selecting delegates.231
3. Party Rules as State Action
After determining that state regulation of the Presidential
nominating process is improper, the court next may inquire
whether national or state party rules themselves constitute state
action and, therefore, are subject to the limits of the Constitution.
227. See Comment, The Supreme Court and the CredentialsChallenge Cases: Ask a
Political Question, You Get a PoliticalAnswer, 62 CALn?. L. REv. 1344 (1974); supra notes
128-45 and accompanying text. But see Note, Freedom of Association or Forced Association: Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 1982 Drr. C.L.
REv. 173 (1982); Note, supra note 69, at 77.
228. "[A state] interest in protecting the integrity of its electoral process cannot be
deemed compelling in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party Convention." Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491 (1975); see supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
230. Brief for Appellants, supra note 80, at 12-13, 25.
231. See Graham v. Fong Eu, 403 F. Supp. 37, 44-45 (N.D. Cal. 1975), aff'd, 423 U.S.
1067 (1976) ("Whether the voters will participate in the delegate selection process, and, if
so, at what stage, and whether their participation will be translated directly into delegate
representation at the national conventions are matters for the political parties themselves to
determine, and, if the parties permit it, for the state.").
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Many state and federal courts have addressed this question.23 2 Na-

tional party rules, which provide for a delegate selection process
"open to all members of the Democratic Party regardless of race,
sex, age, color, creed, national origin, religion, ethnic identity, economic status, or philosophical persuasion," proscribe any form of
invidious discrimination.2 33 Since state parties must follow these

rules, they necessarily must conduct their activities in conformity
with the dictates of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments.3 4
The District of Columbia Circuit ' 35 has virtually eliminated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as a basis for
challenging the constitutionality of delegate apportionment rules
232. For a discussion of political party activities as state action, see Terry v. Adams,
345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947),
cert. denied, 333 U.S. 875 (1948); L. TRImE, supra note 1, § 13-22; Kester, Constitutional
Restrictions on Political Parties,60 VA. L. Rv. 735 (1974); Raymar, supra note 22, at 1820; Rotunda, supra note 23, at 951-60; Note, Judicial Intervention in PoliticalParty Disputes: The PoliticalThicket Reconsidered, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 622, 626-32 (1975); Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 1, at 1155-63. For differing views of federal and
state courts on the applicability of the equal protection clause to political parties, see Gray
v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d
548 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976); Seergy v. Kings County Republican
County Comm., 459 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1972); Bode v. National Democratic Party, 452 F.2d
1302 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972); Georgia v. National Democratic
Party, 447 F.2d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Irish v. Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, 399 F.2d 119
(8th Cir. 1968); Lynch v. Torquato, 343 F.2d 370 (3d Cir. 1965); Doty v. Montana State
Democratic Cent. Comm., 333 F. Supp. 49 (D. Mont. 1971); Dahl v. Republican State
Comm., 319 F. Supp. 682 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Maxey v. Washington State Democratic
Comm., 319 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Wash. 1970); Smith v. State Exec. Comm., 288 F. Supp. 371
(N.D. Ga. 1968); Bentman v. Seventh Ward Democratic Exec. Comm., 421 Pa. 188, 218 A.2d
261 (1966); Bellamy, Applicability of the FourteenthAmendment to the Allocation of Delegates to the DemocraticNational Convention, 38 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 892 (1970); Goldstein,
One Man, One Vote and the Political Convention-Alternative Methods of Implementation: A PoliticalAnalysis, 40 U. Cm. L. REv. 1 (1971); Rauh, Bode, and Fishback, National
Convention Apportionment: The Politics and the Law, 23 Am. U.L. Rav. 1 (1973); Note,
PresidentialNominating Conventions: Party Rules, State Law, and the Constitution, 62
GEo. L.J. 1621 (1974); Note, Bode v. National Democratic Party- Apportionment of Delegates to National Political Conventions, 85 HARv. L. Rzv. 1460 (1972); Note, One PersonOne Vote: The PresidentialPrimariesand Other National Convention Delegate Selection
Processes, 24 HAST. L.J. 257 (1973); Note, Constitutional Safeguards in the Selection of
Delegates to the PresidentialNominating Conventions, 78 YALE L.J. 1228 (1969); Note,
Equal Representation of Party Members on PoliticalParty Central Committees, 88 YALE
L.J. 167 (1978); Comment, supra note 34.
233. HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 59, at rule 4.
234. "The rights of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
235. Ripon Soc'y, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 933 (1976).
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at the national convention:
We conclude, therefore, that the Equal Protection Clause, assuming it is
applicable, does not require the representation in presidential nominating
conventions of some defined constituency on a one person, one vote basis. It
is satisfied if the representational scheme and each of its elements rationally
advance some legitimate interest 1of the party in winning elections or otherwise achieving its political goals.2

Since the goal of political parties in allocating delegates to geographical areas is to strengthen the party and win elections, 237 they
operate within the limits of the Constitution. Indeed,
[i]n cases in which application of constitutional norms to party activity
appears substantially to infringe its associational interest in advancing the
shared political ideas of its members, there may be a compelling party interest-much like a compelling state interest when constitutional rights are asserted against the state government-which
justifies relaxing the enforcement
38
of the independent constitutional norms.

The Constitution protects the party's interests; neither state laws
nor the Constitution should restrict the method of delegate selection chosen by the state parties as long as the procedure conforms
to national party rules.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Before the Chairman of the National Democratic Party
pounds the gavel to mark the opening of the 1984 Democratic National Convention, controversies concerning delegate selection
rules will arise and will require resolution. Candidates, state parties, or state governments may challenge the rules at the national
party convention or in the courts. Because party structure is determined "most immediately by the content, interpretation, and application of its own rules and the relevant public laws,"23 any judicial or legislative interference with the state or national party rules
will affect not only the parties themselves, but also the American
political system.
Since their creation in the early 1800's, state parties have experienced periods of absolute freedom and of comprehensive gov236. Id. at 586-87.
237. HUNT COMM'N REPORT, supra note 59, at 6-9.
238. Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 1, at 1213.

239. A newly enacted provision of the Charter of the National Democratic Party, calling for equal division of state party central committees between men and women, conflicts
with many state statutes. The national party's Committee on State Participation has called
for immediate implementation of this rule. See DEMocRATic NATIONAL COMMITrEE, THs
CHARTER AND BY-LAWS OF THE DEMocRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES, art.

(1982).

11,

§ 16
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ernmental regulation. During the past decade the National Democratic Party has asserted itself and won the right to structure its
organization in a manner that it believes will best further its interests. With the preparation of the 1984 Delegate Selection Rules,
the national party has attempted to extend this capability to the
state parties.
The state parties should not permit the state legislature to determine their organizational structure and nominating processes.
Since the national party rules require fairness and openness in
state delegation selection, states have no reason to legislate in this
area. Political parties can and will monitor their own affairs because they realize that party unity and electoral victory depend
upon fair administration of the delegate selection process. The parties do not want rules disputes to alienate any candidate or interest group. If existing laws conflict with the state party's preferred
delegate selection system, the legislature should repeal these statutes to accommodate the party preference and avoid a confrontation.
Governmental control of the selection of party leaders compromises the electoral process and lessens the incentive for partisan participation in America. By regulating state parties and requiring them to select their leaders in a certain way, the states are
"sacrificing the valuable substance of partisan loyalty and allegiance to the mere mechanism of partisan association. ' 24 0 Parties
will have no opportunity to become instruments of responsible
government if state laws control their most basic and important
function-selection of a candidate for the Presidency.2 4 1 If the
state parties allow the state legislatures to regulate their capacity
to form coalitions for the displacement of incumbent public officials, what check on government is left? State parties should seize
the opportunities provided by the 1984 Delegate Selection Rules
and start governing their own affairs.
PLATTE B. MORING, III

240. A. RANNEY, supra note 11, at 98-99 (quoting H.
342-43 (1915)).
241. Id.
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